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From all SWITCH border routers
About 60.000.000 flows/hour
∼200k internal, ∼800k external IPs/hour
Unsampled
Stored in full since March 2003
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Entropy, Kolmogorov Complexity
Entropy:
Expected information in an object from a set with a
specific selection probability for each element.
Kolmogorov Complexity:
Information in a specific (binary) object.
Kolmogorov Complexity cannot really be measured.
Entropy can be estimated by compression.
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Entropy Estimation by Compression
1. Represent data object in binary form
2. Compress








Relatively bad accuracy (worst case: encrypted
data), but not that far off
Usable for relative comparisons
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Effects of Worm Outbreak
Normal traffic:
Many contact few (servers)
many contact many (P2P)
Connections are mostly successful (bidirectional)
⇒ Flow set is mostly symmetric
Worm outbreak traffic:
Few hosts contact many
Most connections fail
⇒ Flow set is asymmetric
Generic properties of any scanning worm!
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Compression statistics





All 4 fields are converted to host byte-order and
compressed individually per measurement interval of,
e.g., 5 minutes.
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Example 1: Blaster Worm
First observed August 11th, 2003
Tries TCP connection to port 135
Random target selection with local preference
Initially infected 200’000. . .500’000 hosts in 8 hours
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Example 2: Witty Worm
First observed March 20th, 2004
Infects a firewall product
Random target selection
Sends UDP packet with random target and fixed
source port
Initially infected ∼12’000 computers in 75 minutes
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Compression Algorithms
lzo: Lempel-Ziv variant
very fast, bad compression
gzip: Lempel-Ziv variant
well-known GNU compressor, average in all respects
bzip2: Burrows-Wheeler + Huffman coding
slow, very good compression
Entropy estimation by value frequencies:
average speed, high memory needs



























































Date and Time (UTC, 2004)
destination IP: lzo    
destination IP: gzip  
destination IP: bzip2
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Resource Comparison
Method (Library) CPU time / hour (Athlon 2800+)
(60’000’000 flows/hour)
bzip2 (libbz2-1.0) 169 s
gzip (zlib1g 1.2.1.1-3) 52 s
lzo1x-1 (liblzo1 1.08-1) 7 s
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Summary
Generic approach
Works for any fast random scanning worm
Scales linear for CPU and I/O, constant for memory
Not suitable for slower worms
Only limited information about worm details
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Thank You!
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